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Taking Cover:
Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence as a




In a 2002 decision lauded by conservationists, the United States Su-
preme Court held that a series of government moratoria which effec-
tively prevented all development on environmentally sensitive lands in
the Lake Tahoe Basin did not amount to a compensable Fifth Amend-
ment taking of the landowners' property.' Though the decision will not
end the enduring discourse over the extent to which a regulation can
reach before it becomes a taking, it does represent a coup for environ-
mentalists and other nature enthusiasts seeking to preserve the "noble
sheet of blue water" from the threats posed by further development in
the sensitive Basin.'
The Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence over
the last half-century has been notoriously inconsistent. Yet analysis of
this jurisprudence suggests useful patterns for predicting the effect of the
Takings Clause as applied to environmental regulations. In the arid
American West, where water scarcity has increasingly garnered national
attention, litigants disputing water rights presently seek refuge in this in-
consistent takings jurisprudence. As the following shall show, the Court's
recent rejection of property owners' takings claims in the Lake Tahoe
Basin indicates a step back from an increasingly broad view of what con-
stitutes a taking. Through exposition of important trends in takings juris-
prudence, this Note will argue that a public minded exercise of the police
power should not be thwarted by the Fifth Amendment in the context of
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004; B.A., Architec-
ture, Yale University, 1997. A special thanks to my father, A.H. Wilcox, whose reasoned guidance and
passion for the law inspires my own interest in legal scholarship.
i. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 319-20
(2002).
2. Id. at 307.
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a water rights dispute. More specifically, this Note will examine a compli-
cated water rights dispute pending along California's Lower Yuba River,
where various parties claim the government took their rights to one of
the West's most precious resources.
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the present state of
Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence and explore the context in
which petitioners in the Yuba River controversy find themselves. In ad-
dition, this Part will provide both a physical description of the Yuba con-
troversy and a brief summary of the legal claims asserted by petitioners.
In Part II, this Note will explain the unique context through which state
legislators and courts have modified the nature of water rights within
California. Part III will chronicle the evolution of takings jurisprudence,
paying special attention to the intersections between takings decisions
and the environmental impact these decisions have upon regulatory land
use flexibility. Finally, Part IV synthesizes the foundational information
provided in Parts I, II, and III, and applies this foundation to the Yuba
dispute. This Part focuses on the flexibility inherent to water rights under
California law and explains how the reasonable use limitation imposed
on all water rights holders can change as public welfare considerations
continue to evolve. After evaluating both state law and considerations
mandated under federal law, this Part concludes that the Yuba River Pe-
titioners' takings arguments must fail.
I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT FOR TAKINGS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING
The Tahoe-Sierra decision suggests a significant shift in takings ju-
risprudence. Prior to this decision, the Court's holdings had increasingly
favored propertied interests over the interests represented by environ-
mental regulations and land use planners. For example, the much ma-
ligned Nollan v. California Coastal Commission majority held the
property owner's interests paramount to the environmental and aesthetic
preservation propounded by the Commission.' In Nollan, the Court held
3. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987); see also Andrew S. Gold, The
Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory Takings and Physical Takings, io7 DICK. L. REV. 571
(2003); Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp, Making It Up- "Original Intent" and Federal Takings
Jurisprudence, 35 URB. LAW. 203 (2003); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole:
Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Pro-
voke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (20o3); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management
and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943 (2oo3); Rachel
A. Van Cleave, "Death is Different," Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Puni-
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that there was an insufficient nexus between the shoreline easement de-
manded by the Commission and the purposes that easement was de-
signed to promote.4 The decision explained that if it was the
psychological effect occasioned by the public's visual access to the beach
that was the Commission's concern, then other mechanisms might better
have effectuated this design.5 In rejecting the Commission's arguments,
the majority held that the Commission's conditional easement amounted
to "an out-and-out plan of extortion" rather than a valid land use regula-
tion.6
Writing in dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, ar-
gued that the police power indisputably encompassed the authority to
impose such conditions on private development.7 Brennan argued that
the conditional building permit need only be sufficiently related to the
broader preservational purposes to be served by the Coastal Commis-
sion.8 He cautioned that the scientific precision required by the Nollan
majority would deprive regulators of the flexibility necessary to engage
in reasoned and comprehensive land use planning.9
The reasoned planning contemplated by Justice Brennan becomes
extraordinarily complicated in decisions regarding the allocation of lim-
ited water resources among competing users. In California, this is espe-
cially difficult where myriad competing users vie for appropriations from
the drastically variable winter snow melt in the Sierra. At the apex of the
water distribution hierarchy is the State Water Resources Control Board
("SWRCB" or "Board"), charged with the unenviable task of balancing
industrial and agricultural users' needs with the in-stream allotments
necessary to support recreational and environmental interests. Further
complicating matters for state regulators is that these interests are not
real property, but instead unique appurtenant use rights, defined only
through a balanced weighing of competing interests within the system.
The Yuba controversy provides a telling glimpse into the intricacies
of California water law and the prospective impact of takings jurispru-
dence within that legal arena. The controversy focuses on a twenty-four
mile stretch of disputed water. There are seventeen different parties par-
tive Damages -Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 217 (2003); Daniel J. Schwartz, The Potential Effects of Nondeferential Review on Interest Group
Incentives and Voter Turnout, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1845 (2002); Jaime Dawes, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island;
Clarification and More Confusion on the Notice Issue, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 641 (2002).
4. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
6. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
7. Id. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 843-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
December 2003]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ticipating in the litigation, including five regional water districts. The dis-
pute stemmed from the Board's adoption of Decision 1644, which man-
dated potential modifications to the litigants' allocations based on
environmental concerns. Arguing that the SWRCB's Decision 1644 in-
sufficiently accounted for their reasonable uses of Lower Yuba River wa-
ter, three of those districts challenged the constitutionality of the
Decision as a Fifth Amendment taking of their private property.
The following discussion seeks to determine whether in light of the
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Brennan's Nol-
Ian admonition maintains weight, or if the more recent case instead indi-
cates that Nollan was little more than the aberration Justice Brennan
hoped it would be. This determination should illuminate whether the tri-
umph of the environmental interests in Tahoe-Sierra sounds the death
knell for the water district petitioners in the forthcoming Yuba River
controversy. This will show that Tahoe-Sierra marks a return to the
Court's validation of public minded exercises of the police power from
the late twentieth century Court's increased erosion of such powers for
the benefit of private property owners. The issues addressed are increas-
ingly important as population and development pressures continue to
collide with smart growth initiatives and environmental regulations de-
signed to protect the public interest.
B. THE LOWER YUBA RIVER CONTROVERSY
The several forks of the Yuba River flow from its headwaters in the
Sierra Nevada in a generally westerly direction until its confluence with
the Feather River at Marysville, then ultimately into the Sacramento
River north of the state capital. Though various appropriative diversions
occur in the upper reaches of the system, the focus of the instant contro-
versy is the substantial storage facility at New Bullards Bar Reservoir,
which collects the flow of the north fork of the river. Because the vast
storage capacity at New Bullards Bar substantially exceeds that of all of
the upstream storage facilities combined, the river's health can be drasti-
cally affected by changes at New Bullards Bar and below."
The competing water rights at issue in the Yuba controversy arose
out of the Yuba River Project, conceived in the middle of the last century
as a means to ameliorate California's chronically underserved water
needs." In 1965, after completion of the project, the SWRCB issued
permits to Petitioner water districts allocating certain quantities of water
for their exclusive use each year. The structure of the Yuba River Project
1o. Fishery Res. & Water Right Issues of the Lower Yuba River, Decision 1644 at 150 (Cal. State
Water Res. Control Bd. Mar. 1, 2001).
ii. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Yuba Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (No. o-oooo4o5).
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amply encapsulates the general ownership regime of California water
rights. Under modern state water law, title is retained by the state; how-
ever, the state constitution allows the SWRCB to transfer use rights to
massive federal or state undertakings such as the Yuba River Project.
2
These transfers are achieved by permit.'3 Having obtained a permit, wa-
ter projects transfer their use rights by contracts to end users such as the
municipal water districts seeking the injunction in the Yuba River con-
troversy. Ultimately, it is these water districts that service individual resi-
dential, industrial, and agricultural customers.'4
As indicated above, environmental interests are also considered in
allocation decisions. Therefore, through representing the interests of en-
dangered species, the state Department of Fish and Game has become an
increasingly prominent player in these allocation decisions. 5 It is not sur-
prising then that the particular allocation modifications at issue in the
Yuba controversy reflect accommodation of these environmental inter-
ests. The discussion of state water law and Endangered Species Act
("ESA" or "Act") jurisprudence that follows will show that the insuffi-
ciencies and resulting modifications announced in Decision 1644 are
mandated by statewide and national concerns underlying the Act. 6 By
definition, the anadromous fish in the Yuba River fishery require its
fresh waters for breeding. Thus, in response to a depletion of fresh wa-
ter that threatened an endangered species, and in recognition of the im-
portance of the fishery in maintaining the species, the SWRCB issued the
modified allocations reflected in Decision 1644. Decision 1644, therefore,
manifests the Board's navigation of a quite heavily regulated field in an
effort to balance the local water districts' interests while maintaining
suitable in-stream flows, better to preserve populations of endangered
12. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318 (2ooi).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See also Fullerton v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 527-28 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979) The court held that an appropriative right can only be permitted where use is made of the water
appropriated. Id. The decision thus prevented the California Department of Fish and Game from ob-
taining appropriative rights to maintain minimum stream flows in the Mattole River, and instead man-
dated by implication that the department would need to be present at each appropriative decision to
ensure the interests of the states fisheries resources were adequately represented. See id.
16. See i6 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(i) (2000); i6 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000) (making it illegal to harass,
harm, wound, kill, or capture any endangered species of fish or wildlife). See also Jean 0. Melious &
Robert D. Thornton, Contractual Ecosystem Management Under the Endangered Species Act: Can
Federal Agencies Make Enforceable Commitments?, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 489, 497 (999) (providing that
the strict proscriptions noted above have led the Act to be called the "pit bull of federal environmental
statutes"; quoting Donald Barry, Address to A.B.A. Section on Natural Resources, Energy, & Envi-
ronmental Law, Workshop on Endangered Species (Apr. 6, I99O)).
I7. WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 93 (2d ed. I96i).
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anadromous fish.' 8 Increased in-stream reservations debatably reduce the
quantity of water available for distribution by the various water districts
to their customers. Petitioners therefore speculate that in dry water years
they may be required to incur additional expenses pumping groundwater
in order to satisfy their contractual obligations. Based on this theory, Pe-
titioners argue that Decision 1644 comprises a taking of their property
rights with neither due process nor just compensation. Petitioners also
argue that the Board's decision is a denial of their reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations based on the conditions under which their
permits were originally procured. 9
II. THE WATER RIGHT IN CALIFORNIA
Before takings law can be applied to Petitioners' claim in the Yuba
River controversy, it is crucial to understand the unique nature of their
quasi-property interest in the Yuba River's waters. In California's early
days, the state defined water rights using the riparian tradition of first in
time, first in right.20 Property owners had an absolute right to the water
that passed through their parcel, subject only to the activities of upstream
riparian owners." This traditional view was challenged, but ultimately
validated in Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., in which
the state supreme court affirmed the injunction sought by Ms. Herming-
haus and prevented the appropriation sought by the Southern California
utility."
When the facts of Herminghaus are subjected to even cursory ex-
amination, the impracticality of the traditional riparian rights approach
quickly becomes clear. Amelia Herminghaus' family ranch lay traversed
by the San Joaquin River in California's Central Valley.23 Like most
snow-fed rivers in California, including the Yuba, the San Joaquin was
subject to drastic seasonal variations in flow. 4 In the drier months waters
were confined to the principal channels of the river, whereas in the wet
winter and spring months a series of sloughs, or overflow channels trav-
ersing the Herminghaus property routinely flooded their banks giving
i8. Fishery Res. & Water Right Issues of the Lower Yuba River, Decision 1644 at 3-4, (Cal. State
Water Res. Control Bd. Mar. I, 2001).
19. Brief for Petitioners at 12, Yuba Water Dist. (No. Ol-OOOo4o5).
20. See, e.g., Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 611 (Cal. 1926) (noting that riparian
owners at that time in California enjoyed a right to the entireflow of the waters of that river, including,
but not limited to seasonal accretions and flood waters).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 624.
23. Id. at 6o9.
24. Id. at 61o.
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rise to grazing grasses.25 Though the utility's appropriation would have
left considerable water in the river for Herminghaus' use, she would not
have been able to rely on the river's natural flooding to irrigate her
property had that appropriation not been enjoined. Herminghaus main-
tained, and the majority agreed, that her riparian right included not only
the water she needed to irrigate her grassland, but also all of the other
water needed to push this water up over the banks of the sloughs travers-
ing her property. 6 Adopting the traditional view of the riparian right, the
court found that this use should trump that proposed by the utility, even
though the utility's proposed use would have provided energy to con-
sumers in Southern California. 7
Early recognition of the scarcity of water in California and the im-
practicality of the result reached in Herminghaus led to an amendment of
the state's constitution in 1928. The amendment transformed the tradi-
tional understanding of the extent of a riparian right in California, by
subjecting the right to a reasonable use review.29 The amended state con-
stitution provides in part that:
[T]he general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be
put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable ....
The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural
stream or water course in this State is and shall be limited to such wa-
ter as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served,
and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreason-
able use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of di-
version of water.0
Through this redefinition of riparian rights in California, the legisla-
ture substantially eroded the prior distinction between the once para-
mount riparian right and the traditionally burdened appropriative water
rights. The pre-amendment definition is clearly reflected in Herming-
haus, where an arguably wasteful use of water was judicially sanctioned
based solely on the priority of Herminghaus' use and the fact that the
physical location of her property established her as the owner of a para-
mount riparian right.3' As more recent jurisprudence shall show, the
amended state constitution no longer permits the arbitrariness of priority
and physical location to completely predetermine water rights disputes
absent consideration of other public interests.
25. Id. at 61I; see also WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2369 (2d ed. 1961).
26. Herminghaus, 252 P. at 612, 616.
27. Id. at 623-24.
28. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIV, § 3 (1928), amended by CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. X, § 2 (1976).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 20-30.
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Reasonable uses of water have evolved to support the environ-
mental arguments propounded in the current Yuba River controversy.32
Despite this evolution, the water district Petitioners in the Yuba River
controversy have concocted a takings claim to enjoin enforcement of the
SWRCB's Decision 1644. In fashioning its decision, the Board consid-
ered concerns voiced by various grass-roots environmental groups, and
those groups' impacts are reflected, though they would claim insuffi-
ciently, in Decision 1644. For instance, in an effort to preserve the strug-
gling populations of threatened anadromous fish species in the
watershed, the Decision called for the creation of artificial fish hatcher-
ies. These hatcheries, demanding certain quantities and temperatures of
water to ensure preservation of the threatened species' breeding prac-
tices, are only possible through the reservation of certain flows within the
watershed. As indicated earlier, Petitioners argue that this reservation
will necessarily prevent them from fully exercising their appropriative
rights, and therefore constitutes a compensable taking of their property.33
III. THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Justice Scalia's opinion in Nollan marked a turning point that began
limiting the permissible scope of land use regulations. Prior to Nollan,
takings jurisprudence suggested that land use regulators were afforded
great flexibility to enact regulations necessary to protect the public from
the harms posed by unchecked development. After Nollan, however, it
became clear that land use regulations and the judgment of the regula-
tors would be given much less judicial deference.
A. ORIGINS OF COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING TOOLS
The primary threat to which the regional planning agencies in Ta-
hoe-Sierra were responding was the soil erosion caused by development
in the Lake's basin and the aesthetic and environmental consequences
this erosion caused.34 Although use of the police power to preserve aes-
thetics may seem incongruous to some Justices, the Court has long ac-
cepted such considerations as a basis for zoning laws. Indeed, the
foundation of modern zoning and land use law can be traced to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., where
the Court sanctioned a comprehensive town zoning scheme that dimin-
32. See Fullerton v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 527-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
33. Brief for Petitioners at 11-12, Yuba Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (No. oi-
0000405).
34. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 308 (2002).
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ished the value of respondent's property in order better to serve the
town's broader aesthetic interests.
35
As early as i954 the Supreme Court recognized that redevelopment
plans were legitimate exercises of the government's police powers rather
than impermissible Fifth Amendment takings. 6 In Berman v. Parker, the
petitioner owned property marked for condemnation under the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, and sought to enjoin condem-
nation, arguing that the Act's design was to combat slum conditions in
the district, and that his well-maintained department store did not con-
tribute to these disfavored conditions.37 The petitioner further argued
that as commercial property, his store should be spared from a redevel-
opment scheme which propounded a focus on the eradication of sub-
standard housing.3" In sustaining the opinion of the three-judge District
Court and invalidating the petitioner's takings claim, Justice Douglas re-
lied loosely on the text of the Act, which focused on slum clearance and
provided that:
"Substandard housing conditions" means the conditions obtaining in
connection with the existence of any dwelling, or dwellings, or housing
accommodations for human beings, which because of lack of sanitary
facilities, ventilation, or light, or because of dilapidation, overcrowding,
faulty interior arrangement, or any combination of these factors, is in
the opinion of the Commissioners detrimental to the safety, health,
morals, or welfare of the inhabitants of the District of Columbia.39
Though clearly not within the ambit of this definition, Justice Douglas
did not enjoin the condemnation of the petitioner's property, and instead
considered the property's fate as part of the larger scheme envisioned by
the District's planning agency. The Court sustained the commission's
plans in rather ethereal terms, finding that the conditions surrounding
the store could "suffocate the spirit," and allowed that the legislature
may act to protect the community through protection of values that are
"spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary."4 Based on
this vision, the Court would not allow the District's redevelopment plan
35. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,397 (1926). See also Georgia v. Tenn. Cop-
per, 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,356-57 (908);
Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & County of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 366 (I9IO); Reinman v. City of
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 175-76 (19t5); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 4t4 (915)).
36. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,36 (1954).
37. Id. at 31.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 28 n.i (quoting District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 3(r) (1946)).
40. Id. at 32-33.
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to be thwarted by individual landowners standing in the way of an inte-
grated redevelopment proposal.4I
Though the notions espoused in Berman may seem almost saccha-
rine to the twenty-first century critic aware of the largely unfulfilled
promises of mid-century urban redevelopment, the case does mark the
beginning of the recognition of the state's ability to exercise its police
powers to preserve less traditional public interests. Two decades later,
the Court reaffirmed this commitment in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
where the Court rejected a civil rights based challenge to a zoning restric-
tion.42 In Boraas, respondents argued that the village zoning require-
ments, which limited land use to single-family dwellings, thereby
excluding fraternity, boarding, or multi-family housing, were invalid on
several constitutional grounds.43 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas
rejected the respondents' arguments by heavily citing his previous deci-
sion in Berman. Justice Douglas focused on the public welfare-protecting
language in Berman and stated that the taking of private property was
justified "merely to develop a better balanced, more attractive commu-
nity.""4
Through this recharacterization of the petitioner's argument in Ber-
man, Douglas was able to apply the public welfare-protecting theories to
the Boraas respondents' more ethereal arguments of scattered constitu-
tional origin. The Court achieved this result through broadening legisla-
tive authority to permit the mandated land use strategy for the benefit of
the public welfare. Notably, should there have been any confusion that
the public welfare argument may only be applied in areas of urban decay,
this confusion was clarified in Boraas. Though this public welfare argu-
ment had been earlier applied in an effort to elevate the souls of resi-
dents of more blighted neighborhoods in the Nation's capital, Boraas
extended the argument up the eastern seaboard and out the privileged
North Shore of Long Island. In fashioning this extension, Justice Doug-
las' opined that:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles re-
stricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs. This goal is a permissible one within Berman v.
Parker .... The police power is not confined to elimination of filth,
stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family
41. Id. at 35.
42. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. i, (974).
43. Id. (arguing that the village zoning ordinance interfered with a person's constitutionally pro-
tected right to travel and would lead to a social homogeneity inconsistent with the "[niation's experi-
ence, ideology, and self-perception as an open, egalitarian, and integrated society").
44. Id. at 5.
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values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people. 5
Or at least some people, for the desired sanctuary was clearly not avail-
able to the university students challenging the ordinance. Instead, Boraas
indicated that land use regulation should benefit from substantial judicial
deference provided it is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Even the vigorous dissenting opinions in Boraas approve of the ma-
jority's deference to the legislative exercise of its police powers as ap-
plied to land uses.46 Though disagreeing with the majority on other
constitutional issues, Justice Marshall's dissent seems implicitly to accept
that such ordinances may be valid when they are not drafted in an overly
invasive manner, stating that "as a general proposition, I see no constitu-
tional infirmity in a town's limiting the density of use in residential areas
by zoning regulations which do not discriminate on the basis of constitu-
tionally suspect criteria."47 Instead, Marshall's dissent was based on his
estimation that "[the ordinance] reaches beyond control of the use of
land or the density of population, and undertakes to regulate the way
people choose to associate with each other within the privacy of their
own homes.""'
Berman and Boraas mark the beginning of the Court's trend toward
legitimizing legislative regulations that grant broad freedoms to land use
planners to fashion sustainable communities. Commentators are at times
inconsistent on their evaluations of the purposes served by such regula-
tory flexibility. However, some commentators have suggested various
means through which the public welfare benefits when land use planners
can operate free from the constraints imposed by more recent takings ju-
risprudence. One such commentator, Professor Charles Haar, has sug-
gested several ways that such flexibility can better serve the public
through an enhanced planning process." In Haar's classic article he sug-
gests that allowing such flexibility (i) serves as a device for providing no-
tice to the public on the probable outcome of development activities; (2)
allows internal coordination of government actions and programs; (3) al-
lows coordination of regulatory devices; (4) assists in controlling private
activities that might negatively impact the land; and (5) safeguards
against arbitrary regulatory action.5
45. Id. at 9.
46. See, e.g., id. at 17. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW & CON-





B. PENN CENTRAL AND MODERN JURISPRUDENTIAL TOOLS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL TAKINGS ANALYSIS
With regard to property interests, the trend toward greater regula-
tory flexibility was reinforced in the Court's now legendary holding in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.52 In Penn Central,
the railroad owner of New York's Grand Central Terminal sought ap-
proval to build a multi-story office tower over the landmarked passenger
terminal.53 The application was denied by the Landmarks Preservation
Commission, which found that "to balance a 55-story office tower above
a flamboyant Beaux-Arts fagade seems nothing more than an aesthetic
joke."54 Failing to grasp the hilarity, the railroad argued that this denial
was a regulatory taking of its property "right" to the developable air-
space over the terminal, and that through its deprivation, the railroad
should be compensated for the estimated $2 million it annually stood to
lose from lost lease income.
A great deal was at stake. The urban preservation movement had
successfully taken hold in New York City by the time Penn Central was
before the Court, with 31 historic districts and over 400 individual land-
marks already designated 6 Such preservation was and is considered a
public benefit, and measures taken to preserve the historic fabric were
seen to foster civic pride, to stimulate business and tourism, and to en-
hance the "education, pleasure and welfare of the people."57 As public
ownership was both infeasible and less preferable than the mechanism
employed through historic preservation, the railroad's challenge to the
legitimacy of the preservation scheme directly threatened the preserva-
tion movement taking hold across the nation.5
Aware of these national trends, the Court was challenged to deter-
mine whether the regulated entity was entitled to compensation for the
substantial portion of its property rights which it could no longer use.59 In
considering this question, the Court summarized various approaches it
historically had taken in dealing with regulatory takings. The Court first
noted that the economic impact of the challenged regulation and the ex-
52. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
53. Id. at 117-18.
54- Id.
55. Id. at 16.
56. Id. at 1ii.
57. Id. at lO9.
58. Id. at io9 n.6 (noting that public ownership would have several negative consequences for the
public welfare, such as reduction of the tax base, budgetary burdens through maintenance, and the
likelihood that such ownership would not sufficiently preserve the functioning urban essence of the
structures, but would instead result in the creation of non-functioning museums).
59. Id. at 122 (distilling the four questions posed to the Court).
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tent to which it interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations
were valid criteria for takings considerations.6 Penn Central's challenge
might have proved successful had the Court stopped here, but it went on
to note that the character of the governmental action must also be evalu-
ated.6' By this, the Court explained that when the action can be charac-
terized as a physical invasion of the interest, a successful takings claim
would be more likely than when the action was better characterized as a
regulation that just limits the use of the property.62 In the latter type of
cases, however, the Court suggested that use restriction is justified based
on promotion of the common good. 63 The Court suggested that regula-
tions tended not to be physical invasions, and reiterated its approval for
traditional zoning regulations, despite their potentially adverse impacts
on property interests.6'4 Though this may seem harsh, it is actually reflec-
tive of a pragmatic approach to government regulation. Almost any regu-
lation will have an adverse effect on some party; but if the state had to
compensate every property owner for each loss stemming from regula-
tion, then government attempts to enhance the public welfare would be
immediately stymied.
C. NOLLAN AND DOLAN: REGRESSION FROM ENVIRONMENTAL
PRESERVATION THROUGH TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
The current Court has shown signs of regression toward a broad
view of what constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking. The Court's regres-
sion is dramatically evident in its sequence of opinions in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, and
Dolan v. City of Tigard, all of which chronicle the Court's evolving stan-
dards for checking the extent of permissible property regulation.
In Lucas, the Court allowed itself to be constrained by dubious find-
ings of the lower courts, and held that when a regulation renders prop-
erty economically valueless, a per se taking has occurred. 6' The petitioner
had purchased two beach-front parcels subject to South Carolina's exten-
sive coastal protection regulations.6 Subsequent to his purchase, the state
adopted even more restrictive coastal erosion prevention legislation that
prohibited the petitioner from building on his lots. 67 The trial court had
ruled that the Beachfront Management Act rendered Lucas' property




64. Id. at 125.
65. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).




completely valueless. 6' Lucas argued that this determination was a com-
plete extinction of his property rights, and the Court, in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Scalia, agreed. Despite the council's contention that the
legislative determination that Lucas' proposed use would be noxious in
light of the state's legitimate efforts to protect the public welfare through
erosion prevention, the Court upheld a categorical rule against complete
regulatory takings.
9
Justice Scalia's opinion looked all the way back to the nascency of
regulatory takings jurisprudence, and equated the extinction of building
rights in Lucas with the Court's 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon." In Mahon, the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania regulation
that denied the petitioner the right to mine the totality of coal on its
property.7' Mahon reflected the Court's first explicit recognition that
though all regulation affects property rights, there is a point at which the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is triggered despite the regulation be-
ing a legitimate exercise of police power.72 However, the Supreme Court
neglected to define precisely where this point lay, and instead crafted
only the maxim that "while property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."73
The Lucas opinion, though important to an understanding of recent
takings jurisprudence, is of limited relevance beyond its peculiar facts.
Specifically, the lower court's finding that the property was completely
valueless after the regulation seems a bit hard to swallow. Though peti-
tioner correctly asserted that the regulation prohibited him from execut-
ing his development as originally planned, it seems unlikely that the
restriction actually rendered the property completely valueless. Though
it is not unlikely that Lucas would have substantial difficulty recouping
the $975,000 paid for the property, it seems equally unlikely that he
would receive nothing for it at all. Some Justices found the valuelessness
determination by the lower court incredible. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy found that this particular finding by the South Carolina
Court of Common Pleas was "curious."74 Writing in dissent, Justice
Blackmun found it entirely "implausible."75 Justice Blackmun, specifi-
cally objecting to the new per se rule outlined by the majority, accused it
68. Id. at IOO9.
69. Id. at 1026.
70. Id. at 1026-27.
71. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922). See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323-24 (2002).
72. Mahon, 26o U.S. at 414-15.
73. Id. at 415.
74. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1033-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. Id. at lO36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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of "launching a missile to kill a mouse." 6 Justice Blackmun was incredu-
lous to the valuelessness determination, as he accepted that the right to
improve the property had been substantially curtailed, but correctly
noted that the right to exclude, one of the most essential of the sticks in
the property bundle, was completely untouched by the regulation." Jus-
tice Blackmun also noted, perhaps less persuasively, that limited use
rights remained, as the petitioner could still picnic, swim, and camp on
his property. 8 Though $975,000 does seem to be a bit too high a price for
such privileges, Blackmun's point that petitioner's property interests
were not completely extinguished does not strain credulity.
The Court's Lucas decision therefore relies entirely on the lower
court's findings. Once the Court of Common Pleas' determination that
the property was valueless is stricken, the majority's argument seems to
topple under the weight of remaining takings jurisprudence. After all,
many decisions by the Supreme Court have provided that a less than
complete extinction of property value is insufficient to warrant govern-
ment compensation.79 In addition, expelling the valuelessness determina-
tion makes reconciliation with Penn Central quite difficult. This difficulty
stems from the Penn Central discussion of the impropriety of severing
particular components of a property interest when engaging in takings
analysis."' Recall that the railroad's argument in Penn Central that the
operation of the historic preservation statute effectuated an impermissi-
ble taking was rejected in part because it severed the railroad's interest in
the terminal's air rights from the rest of the property. The Court noted
that such a separation was improper, and instead advocated a compre-
hensive approach requiring courts to look to the property as a whole in
evaluating takings claims. In Lucas, once it is accepted that other rights
to the property survived the regulation, such as the right to exclude,
and-perhaps less persuasively -the other rights discussed in Black-
mun's dissent, it becomes clear that to compensate for the lost develop-
ment rights would be to sever impermissibly this discrete right from the
property interest as a whole. Perhaps severing the discrete air right from
the balance of a property interest is less permissible then the more ethe-
76. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
78. Lucas, 505 U.S. at io44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. See generally Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 397 (1926) (holding that
a zoning regulation, though having the practical effect of reducing the developer-owner's property
value by seventy-five percent, was a legitimate exercise of the police power to protect the public inter-
est, and was thus non-compensable).
8o. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (978) (stating that "'[tfaking'
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated").
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real severing of one of the traditional rights in the proverbial bundle.
Nevertheless, the Lucas Court's failure to address severability ade-
quately seems to neglect a key component to the Penn Central holding.
Finally, the valuelessness determination seems further undermined by
the implicit suggestion of the extensive development occurring on the
prestigious Isle of Palms at the time Lucas was decided." Though the ma-
jority does not explicitly indicate as much, it seems plausible that a de-
velopment rights transfer may have been permissible in this rapid
development environment, and the lower court finding is thus rendered
even less believable.
Despite these inconsistencies with prior takings jurisprudence, Lucas
stands as good law. On its face, the per se takings category reinvigorated
by Lucas may only be applicable where the challenged regulation has
completely extinguished the plaintiff's property value. However, later
opinions have suggested that it might be extended to cases where there is
just a "token interest" left in the property." Therefore, Lucas has drawn
a line in the sand, telling regulators that no matter the public interest at
stake if the regulation deprives the land of all economic value it is a tak-
ing.
The Supreme Court's decision in Nollan also tightened the reins on
legislators seeking to enact regulations which afford public protections at
the expense of private property owners. In Nollan, the Court rejected the
Coastal Commission's quid pro quo approach to the grant of building
permits for beachfront property, finding that this approach amounted to
virtual extortion in the absence of a sufficient nexus between the pur-
poses of the regulation and that exacted from the property owner. In
Nollan, the Commission had thought that the exaction sought in ex-
change for the building permit was reasonable in light of prior challenges
to its exactions schemed that had invoked much less stringent standards
by reviewing courts.84 For instance, in Grupe v. California Coastal Com-
mission the California Supreme Court found that imposition of an access
condition like that imposed upon the Nollans, was permissible provided
only that there was an indirect relationship between the means for exac-
tion and the Commission's ends."' In both cases the Commission sought
to increase the public's access to the shoreline, although in Nollan, the
desired "access" was purely psychological. The Commission argued that
by allowing for a shoreline easement across the Nollan's property the
81. Lucas, 505 U.S. at ioo8.
82. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,631 (200).
83. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,837 (1987).
84. Id. at 828-29.
85. Grupe v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 6oi (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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public, traveling along Pacific Coast Highway, would be able to see peo-
ple walking on the beach in the spaces between houses.86 This, it was ar-
gued, would allow the driving public to feel sufficiently connected with
the beach that they would turn off the highway at Faria County Park, a
quarter mile up the road from the Nollan's home.8
7
The Commission's connection between the exaction and its purpose
does seem a bit tenuous, but in articulating the nexus requirements, Jus-
tice Scalia stripped regulators of valuable tools necessary for effectuating
their public charters. Nollan holds that the nexus requirement is met only
when the regulation to be defended substantially advances a legitimate
state purpose and finds that "unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is
not a valid regulation of land use."" Justice Scalia rests the nexus test on
the Court's earlier decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon. In Agins, the
Court held that when a regulation does not substantially advance a le-
gitimate state interest or denies an owner all economically viable use of
his land then it is a taking.89 In Nollan, Justice Brennan dissented, arguing
that a deferential standard should apply to afford regulators the flexibil-
ity to make adequate land use planning decisions.' Justice Brennan
stated that a regulation should be permissible where the state rationally
could have decided that it would achieve the regulators' objectives.'
Thus, Justice Scalia's standard is substantially less deferential to the
states than Justice Brennan's, and a far cry indeed from the indirect rela-
tionship test formerly applied by the California state courts.9"
Building upon the backward momentum developed in Nollan, the
Court again recalibrated the standard in Dolan v. City of Tigard, where
once again the public welfare interest ultimately succumbed to the pri-
vate property interest.93 In Dolan, the city sought to enhance the public
welfare through decreased automobile usage by exacting a right-of-way
for a bicycle path behind the petitioner's property in exchange for grant-
ing a permit to expand the petitioner's plumbing and electric supply
86. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-29.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 837.
89. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (5980) (holding that a zoning ordinance is fa-
cially constitutional where the regulation bears a "substantial relationship to the public welfare, and
[its] enactment inflicted no irreparable injury upon the landowner"; citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,395-97 (1926)).
9
o .Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Grupe v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 6os (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
93. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,396 (1994).
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store.9 4 Tigard's challenged regulation stemmed directly from the com-
prehensive and statewide land management program adopted by Oregon
in I973."5 Though finding the city's and state's goals commendable, Chief
Justice Rehnquist ultimately rejected the means through which these
goals were met, and in doing so outlined an additional layer of the stan-
dard to be applied in evaluating takings claims.96
Whereas Nollan had demanded that a court find a substantial rela-
tionship between the exaction and the purposes of the regulation, Dolan
further mandated that there also exist a sufficient degree of connection
between the exaction itself and the projected impact of the proposed de-
velopment. 97 Thus, whereas Nollan mandates a degree of qualitative
nexus, Dolan additionally requires a quantitative proportionality analy-
sis. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that it had been unnecessary for the
Court to outline this additional requirement in Nollan where the tenuous
relationship between the exaction and the purposes it sought to achieve
obviated further evaluation.9 In Dolan, the Court found that there was a
sufficient nexus between the city's attempt to exact an easement from the
property owner and the purposes of the planning regulations. 9
However, Tigard's exaction scheme failed after an exhaustive fact-
specific review because the Court found that there was an insufficient
connection between the easement sought and the impact of Dolan's de-
sired improvements." In so determining, the Court noted that Dolan's
proposal would more than double the size of her shop while simultane-
ously increasing its impervious parking area.'0 ' The city countered that
the increased size of the impervious parking area was directly connected
to its management of the flood plain, and that the increased size of the
store would generate additional trips to and from it which justified the
insistence on a pedestrian and bicycle path.0 2 Nevertheless, the Court
held that the exaction was insufficiently connected to the projected im-
pact of Dolan's enhancements.' 3
In formulating its rejections, the Court seemed aware that it was
forging new ground, and looked to standards applied by state courts in
94. Id. at 379-81.
95. Id at 377-78 (citing OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.175-.250 (iq99); requiring all cities and counties to
adopt planning measures in conformity with standards set at the state level).
96. Id. at 394-95.
97. Id. at 386.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 387.
oo. Id. at 391-96.
ioi. Id. at 387.
102. Id. at 388-99.
103. Id. at 392-95.
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determining what degree of connection should be required. In develop-
ing the applicable federal standard, the Court noted the relatively lax
standard applied in Montana, and contrasted that with a much stricter
standard applied in Illinois. 4 In Montana and other states, all that was
required of the exaction was that it be very generally related to the de-
velopment proposal. 5 The exaction at issue in Dolan would likely have
satisfied the Montana standard. In contrast, Illinois courts applied the
much stricter "specifically and uniquely attributable" test, invalidating
exactions unless the local government could show that the exaction was
directly proportional to the need specifically created by the development
project.,R Noting these extremes, the Court arrived at a standard that
would be just right. Although Goldilocks would undoubtedly be pleased,
the Court's new rough proportionality standard and its subsequent appli-
cation in Dolan does little to clarify takings law."°
Although rough proportionality may seem like a reasonable com-
promise between the Montana and Illinois standards, Dolan reveals that
in application the standard tends more towards Illinois' stricter "specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable" test than might first appear. In Dolan,
despite the city's justifications and articulated linkages between the exac-
tion demanded and the building proposal submitted, the Court held the
exaction was a taking.'° The Court noted that no precise mathematical
calculations were necessary under the rough proportionality standard,
however, it subsequently stated that "the city must make some effort to
quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the pedes-
trianlbicycle pathway."'" The strictness of the new standard is further
evident in the Court's scrutiny of Tigard's word choice, drawing a distinc-
tion between the city's insufficient finding that the path could offset con-
gestion and the required finding that it will offset this congestion." Such
a hair-splitting distinction is indeed difficult to reconcile with the Court's
claim that precise calculations are unnecessary.
D. TAHOE-SIERRA AND REVITALIZATION OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
Against this background of tightening standards, the Tahoe-Sierra
decision comes as a pleasant surprise to comprehensive resource plan-
IO4. Id. at 389-90 (comparing Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 186
(Mont. 1964), with Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ill. i96I)).
105. See Billings Properties, 394 P.2d at i9o-91; Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673, 675 (N.Y.
1966).
io6. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Say., 176 N.E.2d at 802.
107. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
io8. Id. at 383-96.
to9. Id. at 395-96 (emphasis added).
iio. Id. at 395.
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ners. The propertied petitioners in Tahoe-Sierra challenged the applica-
tion of two regional planning decisions that deprived them of all devel-
opable use of their property during a thirty-two month period."' The
petitioners were owners of both improved and unimproved parcels in the
basin who had purchased their property amidst a heavily regulated bi-
state comprehensive zoning scheme designed to protect the national
treasure from further erosion."2
Lower court decisions throughout the enduring challenge addressed
different components of petitioners' takings claims with varying results,
but the Supreme Court ultimately confined its decision to the determina-
tion of "whether a moratorium on development imposed during the
process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se
taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of
the United States Constitution.""..3 In a 6-3 decision, the Court answered
this question in the negative."4 Rather than crafting a new category of
per se takings in such situations where building moratoria have rendered
property temporarily undevelopable, Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, instead applied familiar Penn Central balancing to determine that
the moratoria at issue were permissible."5 The Court thus concluded that
the uncompensated moratoria were not constitutionally infirm under the
'fairness and justice' inquiry manifested by the Penn Central balancing
approach.",6 In so deciding, Justice Stevens and the Court were heavily
influenced by the implications of what could occur were land use regula-
tors not afforded some flexibility in fashioning comprehensive planning
schemes."' Stevens noted that, were such moratoria impermissible under
takings law, landowners would be encouraged to develop their parcels as
quickly as possible, resulting in "inefficient and ill-conceived" develop-
ment patterns."8 The opinion also notes that such flexibility is even more
crucial where the regulator is developing a regional plan rather than
merely exercising its authority over an individual parcel."9
iii. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 311-12
(2002).
112. Id. at 309, 312.
113. Id. at 3o6.
114. Id. at 341-43.
115. Id. at342
116. Id. at 336.
117. Id. at 339.
i 8. Id.
i19. Id. at 340.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR WATER DISPUTES IN THE ARID WEST
Tahoe-Sierra then seems to mark a distinct departure from the strict
devolution of takings jurisprudence exemplified in the Court's decisions
in Nollan and Dolan. This departure seems to point takings analysis back
toward the familiar territory etched in Penn Central, and guides courts to
apply the balancing techniques for which they have traditionally been
particularly well equipped when evaluating regulatory takings claims.
The forthcoming Yuba River controversy may thus provide an interest-
ing glimpse into whether the High Court's most recent guidance will be
heeded. This, in turn, should indicate how courts will treat takings claims
as they pertain to water rights in the arid West, and thus, whether the
Fifth Amendment shall allow regulators the flexibility to balance the
numerous interests in the Yuba's waters.
A. THE YUBA RIVER PETITIONERS' CLAIMS
As noted above, the water district petitioners in the Yuba River con-
troversy object to several provisions of the SWRCB's decision that modi-
fies their rights and allows for the competing uses on the strained
watershed. Petitioners argue that modification of their rights should
amount to a compensable taking, despite the requirements imposed by
the Board and the Department of Fish and Game as it seeks to discharge
its duty to protect the endangered and threatened anadromous fish
within the watershed.
Specifically, the petitioner water districts argue that if they are
forced to meet the requirements imposed in Decision 1644, they will be
unable to meet their obligations through direct diversions from the river
in certain dry water years." Unable to meet these demands from diver-
sions, they will be forced to pump groundwater.' This process is more
expensive than diversions from surface water for which they had con-
tracted with the SWRCB. The petitioners argue that forcing them to en-
dure this added expense is a compensable taking under both the state
and federal constitutions. 2 2 Petitioners next assert that the requirements
under the Fishery Management Plan demand water quantities from the
water districts that are far in excess of those required of them under their
1965 agreements, pursuant to which they obtained their permits.' 3 In ad-
dition, the Management Plan requires petitioners to release certain quan-







tities and temperatures of water that are inconsistent with the original
agreements. These arrangements are made for the creation of artificial
fish hatcheries, dubbed "virtual hatcheries" by petitioners, to ebb the de-
cline of various sub-species of endangered and threatened salmon within
the watershed.'24 Finally, petitioners argue that provisions within the
Management Plan which demand that they make and fund needed im-
provements to fish screens and other protective devises are impermissi-
ble in light of their 1984 agreements with the Department of Fish and
Game and contrary to that agency's own regulations.'25 More succinctly,
petitioners argue that Decision 1644 takes their contract and property
rights without due process of law, and they demand compensation for
this taking of their reasonable investment-backed expectations 6
B. THE FLEXIBILITY INHERENT TO A WATER RIGHT'S DEFINITION IN
CALIFORNIA UNDERMINES PETITIONERS' TAKINGS CLAIMS
In evaluating the merits of petitioners' arguments, it is important to
understand the nature of the property interest they claim was impermis-
sibly taken. As discussed, a water right in California is enjoyed subject to
the reasonableness of its use with respect to other users in the water-
shed.'27 Subsequent to the adoption of the state constitutional amend-
ment, Amelia Herminghaus's flagrantly wasteful water use was no longer
paramount to the needs of other users within the watershed. As state
courts struggled with the novelty of this property interest, the reasonable
use doctrine began to take form and to shape the future of water use
within California.
Whereas pre-amendment decisions had focused upon the superiority
of riparian users' rights over those of appropriators, this distinction was
largely eroded in subsequent cases, such as Peabody v. City of Vallejo,
decided less than a decade after Herminghaus2 Peabody was largely a
dispute as to the rights to extraordinary overflow waters in which the
parties involved failed adequately to couch their argument in the terms
appropriate with respect to the recent constitutional amendment. The
124. Id. at ii.
125. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5989 (West 1998) ("After acceptance, should the screen fail to
function in an efficient manner, no changes in conditions affecting its operation having occurred sub-
sequent to the acceptance of the screen, the owner shall not be required to install a new screen. How-
ever, the department may install another screen at the sole cost and expense of the department of a
type, size, mesh and at a location agreed upon by the department and the owner, or approved by the
Department of Water Resources .... ).
126. Brief for Petitioners at 12, Yuba Water Dist. v. State Res. Control Bd. (No. oI-OOOO4O5).
127. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIV, § 3 (1928), amended by CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. X, § 2 (1976).
528. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1935).
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California Supreme Court, however, did provide some guidance in inter-
preting this new amendment, and indicated that:
So far as we are advised, this asserted right does not inhere in the
riparian right at common law, and as a natural right cannot be asserted
as against the police power of the state in the conservation of its waters.
This asserted right involves an unreasonable use or an unreasonable
method of use or an unreasonable method of diversion of water as con-
templated by the Constitution."9
The Vallejo holding directly conflicts with the pre-amendment Herming-
haus decision, even though the disputes relate to similar facts involving
rights to overflow waters. Vallejo therefore highlights the origins of mod-
ern water law in California.
i. A Reasonableness Determination Is Subject to Change as Public
Welfare Considerations Evolve
Though Vallejo reflects the potential superiority of the state's police
power over water rights, disputes among individual users still must be
evaluated on the basis of their reasonableness. A reasonableness deter-
mination can be quite harsh, as was the case in Joslin v. Marin Municipal
Water District, where the determination resulted in the complete exter-
mination of a particular use of the water.3 ° Joslin involved a dispute be-
tween the municipal water agency providing water for domestic users in
suburban San Francisco and a private gravel mining operation, in which
the appellant gravel company sought inverse condemnation damages for
the effects of the water district's upstream dam operation. 3' After com-
pletion of the dam, flood waters stopped washing through appellant's
property.'32 The appellant argued that this had damaged his gravel busi-
ness because he relied on these flood waters to deposit sand and gravel in
the stream bed that the company mined. Joslin argued that this dam had
caused a diminution in his property value of $250,000 and lost sand and
gravel of at least $25,000."'
The court rejected Joslin's inverse condemnation claim, and in the
process further clarified the bounds of the property interest obtained in
the state's waters." The court recognized that Joslin and all other water
rights holders did indeed have a property interest in the water, but that
the state Constitution demanded that this right be subject to a reason-
ableness servitude.3 5 When reviewing the extent of this servitude upon
129. Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
130. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 900 (Cal. 1967).
131. Id. at 89o.
132. Id. at 891.
133. Id.




the appellant's property right, the court balanced the competing uses,
and ultimately, the municipal users were victorious. 1, 6 In so doing, the
court trivialized the sand and gravel operation, rhetorically asking "[i]s it
'reasonable,' then, that the riches of our streams, which we are charged
with conserving in the great public interest, are to be dissipated in the
amassing of mere sand and gravel which for aught that appears subserves
no public policy?"'37 Though perhaps overly brutal from the small busi-
ness owner's perspective, the decision does offer some guidance in to the
weighing of competing water uses under circumstances that limit avail-
ability. The court reasoned that "[a]lthough we have said, what is a rea-
sonable use of water depends on the circumstances of each case, such an
inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considera-
tions of transcendent importance.'.. 8
For poor Joslin then, the sand and gravel outfit simply did not have a
sufficient public policy justification, at least as communicated through
the affidavits he provided, to limit the municipal water district's actions.
Though holdings that elevate domestic uses over other water uses are not
uncommon, the statewide considerations that formed the basis of the
opinion need not be confined merely to domestic water use. The state-
wide considerations of transcendent importance reasonably also include
the nationwide, indeed international interest in protecting the endan-
gered and threatened species at issue in the Yuba River controversy.
Such is the tenor of the challenges to the Board's Decision 1644. Though
the statewide interest asserted in Joslin is that of water conservation and
reasonable use, these interests seem expansive enough to embrace the
conservational aims of the Endangered Species Act as mandated by fed-
eral legislation.
2. The Values Underlying the Endangered Species Act Necessarily
Impact a Reasonableness Consideration
The language of the Endangered Species Act itself reflects a con-
gressional determination that the interests it seeks to protect are para-
mount to all others. This determination emerges in the initial section of
the act, where it provides that:
The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the eco-
systems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such
endangered species and threatened species, and to take such steps as
136. Id. at 900.
137. Id. at 895.
138. Id. at 894.
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may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties set forth
in... this section.
39
The importance of these interests are further emphasized by the
Act's command that all federal departments and agencies must act to
conserve threatened and endangered species, but this emphasis is most
clearly articulated by decisional law. 40 Perhaps the most stunning reflec-
tion of the judiciary's resolve in interpreting the demands of the Act in a
manner honoring its initial purposes appears in Tennessee Valley Author-
ity v. Hill.4' In Tennessee Valley Authority the Supreme Court was chal-
lenged to resolve a dispute between a federally funded dam construction
project and the preservation of the sole habitat of a recently discovered
endangered fish species.' 4 Shockingly, the Supreme Court enjoined con-
struction of the expensive and nearly completed dam in order to protect
the previously unknown snail darter, a three-inch-long fish that had been
discovered only in I973. 43 Taking note of the Secretary of the Interior's
conclusion that "'[t]he proposed impoundment of water behind the pro-
posed Tellico Dam would result in total destruction of the snail darter's
habitat,"' the Court issued the injunction because the Act commanded
that no action authorized, funded, or carried out by a federal agency may
jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species or result in
the modification of such a species' habitat.'" The opinion further pro-
vided that impracticality is not a justification for an agency's evasion of
the Act's mandate, recognizing that "'[t]hey can, and they must [observe
the Act's mandate]. The law is clear." ' 45
This evaluation reveals that in a reasonableness review, the ultimate
determination "can" and "must" evolve over time to reflect changing leg-
islative priorities. A use that might not have seemed reasonable shortly
after the amendment of the California Constitution in 1928 could cer-
tainly become so by the end of the twentieth century. A dedication to
further the purposes of the Endangered Species Act is just such a rea-
sonable use. Congress has made clear through the Act that quasi-judicial
mandates such as that offered by the SWRCB in Decision 1644 must
provide protections for threatened and endangered species.
'
46
139. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).'
140. Id. § 1531(c)(t).
141. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 158, 172-73.
144. Id. at 162 (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 47, 505-506 (Oct. 9, 1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.)).
145. Id. at 184 (quoting 119 CONG. REc. 42,913 (1973)).
146. See, e.g., I6 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (2ooo) (providing that it is the policy'of Congress that federal
agencies shall cooperate with state and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert with
conservation of endangered species).
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3. California's Physical Solution Doctrine Further Impacts a
Proper Reasonableness Analysis
In California, state law dictates that courts resolve water disputes in
a manner that reflects the nature of the competing uses at issue. This
mandate is evident through California's adoption of the physical solution
doctrine.' 47 The doctrine was applied in City of Lodi v. East Bay Munici-
pal Utility District, in which the court struggled to determine how best to
distribute appropriative water rights along California's Mokelumne
River. 41 In Lodi, the court announced that trial courts were compelled to
determine the availability of and then offer a physical solution to the dis-
puted water rights where such a solution was possible. 149 Though Lodi
specifically involved the prevention of water waste, the doctrine and its
basis in the 1928 constitutional amendment is applicable to all reason-
ableness evaluations within California water law. 5
California's adoption of the physical solution doctrine is further rein-
forced through the Court of Appeal's decision in SWRCB v. Forni, is-
sued in 1976."' In Forni, the SWRCB initiated the action to enjoin Napa
Valley winemakers from drawing water directly from the Napa River
during frost season so as to protect their vineyards.'52 By spraying a fine
mist over the vineyards during periods of threatened frost, the vintners
were able to protect their valuable crops, but the collaborative effect of
the winemakers' activities during such periods had an instantaneous ef-
fect on the river's flow that deprived other agricultural users their rights
to the Napa's water.'53 The trial court found that the winemakers' activi-
ties did not constitute an unreasonable use of the river's limited flow.
However, the Court of Appeal reversed in favor of the Board, reasoning
that the amended state Constitution as interpreted by Peabody and other
decisions mandated a more thorough factual inquiry than that allowed by
a motion for judgment on the pleadings.'5 4 The appellate court ruled that
the fairness of the physical solution advocated by the SWRCB -that the
vintners' create reservoirs to establish reserves for such frosts-was
"manifestly a question of fact."'55 The court indicated that where a physi-
cal solution is required, the imposition does not amount to a taking, as
the physical solution doctrine lies neither within the realm of eminent
147. See generally City of Lodi v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 6o P.2d 439,449-50 (Cal. 1936).
148. Id. at 44o.
149. Id. at 449-50.
150. Id.
I5x. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
152. Id. at 853.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 856-58.
155. Id. at 856.
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domain nor that of regulatory takings.' 56 Rather, Forni holds that the
Board's decision was a legitimate exercise of the police power to enforce
the reasonable use requirement of the California Constitution.'
5 7
4. Resolution of the Yuba River Controversy Must Reflect
Considerations of Statewide and National Interests
The Endangered Species Act and the state's physical solution doc-
trine compelled the SWRCB to modify Petitioners' water rights. Thus,
the solution the Board mandates in Decision 1644 is an entirely valid ex-
ercise of the police power under both federal and state law. Nevertheless,
Petitioners argue that the Board's solution effects an unconstitutional
taking of their property. Although the Court of Federal Claims' decision
in Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States lends support
to Petitioners' takings arguments, that decision appears premised on a
misconstruction of state water law. Application of the traditional takings
decisions already discussed, however, reveal that whether adjudged using
the balancing test developed in Penn Central or under the more rigorous
standards developed in Nollan and Dolan, petitioners' takings argument
should fail.
Petitioners' takings arguments initially seem supported by the recent
Tulare decision.', 8 Cosmetically, the Tulare dispute is similar to the Yuba
controversy. Tulare arose from the National Marine Fisheries Service's
review of California's Central Valley Project and State Water Project as
required by the Endangered Species Act.'59 As instructed by the Act, the
Water Projects crafted reasonable and prudent alternatives to the then-
existing pumping standards that had created salinity levels in the Sacra-
mento Delta that threatened winter-run chinook salmon.' 6° This alterna-
tive solution demanded that water previously available to the Water
Projects became unavailable, thus requiring those projects to reduce
their contractual deliveries to the plaintiffs.' 6' Plaintiffs successfully ar-
gued that this diminution amounted to a compensable taking of their
property. 6,
The Court of Claims rejected all three of the counterarguments
posed by the United States. First, the Government argued that the im-
plementation of the reasonable alternative mandated by the ESA frus-
trated the purpose of the contract between the water projects and the
156. Id. at 855-56.
157. Id. at 857.
158. 49 Fed. C1. 313 (2ooi).
159. Id. at 315.
16o. Id.
161. Id. at 315-16.
162. Id. at 324.
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plaintiffs and did not effectuate a taking under Supreme Court precedent
of Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States.6" Next, employing familiar
Penn Central balancing language, the Government argued that plaintiffs'
reasonable investment-backed expectations had not been thwarted and
that no regulatory taking had thus occurred.' 64 Third, the Government
made the traditional argument that the regulation imposed went no fur-
ther than underlying principles of state law allowed, and that it was thus
liable for no taking.' 65 As indicated above, the Court of Claims was not
receptive to any of these arguments.
The court's rejection of the Government's defenses seems faulty
based on the fundamental misconstruction of California water law on
which it relies. The failure of the Government's first two arguments
seems based in large degree on the Court of Claims' refusal to allow for
the state constitutional limitations imposed on water users in California.
As noted, the Government relied on Omnia for the proposition that the
Fifth Amendment "has always been understood as referring only to a di-
rect appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the
exercise of lawful power." '66 The Court, however, found that this reading
of the case was inapplicable to the dispute in Tulare, where the court
found that the plaintiffs' contractual interest was in a "stipulated volume
of water. ' ' 6' The decision seems a bit internally inconsistent. Although
the court recognized some elements of state water law, specifically that
the right conferred is never more than that of reasonable use, it failed to
address the other crucial element of a water right in California, specifi-
cally that those reasonable uses can and do change. Ignoring the flexibil-
ity of reasonable use while noting that all the Water District possessed
was a contractual right to reasonable use allowed the court to find that
the regulatory action responding to changing circumstances completely
eviscerated the right formerly possessed.' 68
Having concluded that the reasonable alternative mandated under
the Act had completely eviscerated plaintiffs' water right, the court then
had little difficulty likening the restriction imposed by the regulation to a
physical rather than a regulatory taking.' 69 This determination, in turn,
foreclosed the traditional Penn Central balancing test, and led the court
to make the curious statement that "a mere restriction on use-the hall-
163. Id. at 316-17.
164. Id. at 317.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510 (1923)).
167. Id. at318.




mark of a regulatory action -completely eviscerates the right itself since
plaintiffs' sole entitlement is to the use of the water."'7° The court rein-
forced its determination by analogizing the Tulare dispute to that in In-
ternational Paper Co. v. United States, where the Supreme Court found a
complete taking through the Government's requisition of all the water
International Paper needed to operate its mill. 7' Therefore, the court
analogized the statutorily mandated variable restriction on use of a vol-
ume of water in Tulare to the total diversion of water occasioned in In-
ternational Paper, and allowed this questionable analogy to justify a
finding that a taking had occurred in both decisions.
Considering both the California water law cases and federal takings
jurisprudence already discussed, the Court of Claims' decision in Tulare
seems odd indeed. Though in Tulare, plaintiffs did contract for a specific
volume of water with the water projects, it seems clear enough that the
water projects could not contract away any more than they themselves
had acquired. As the state Constitution limits those projects' rights ini-
tially to only reasonable use as informed by other competing state inter-
ests, it seems curious that, by the Court of Claims' reasoning, once the
contract was signed that limited usufructuary right was somehow trans-
formed into a much more comprehensive ownership right such that fu-
ture limitation of volume would constitute the complete invasion
proscribed by the Fifth Amendment.
Based on the uncertainty inherent in a water right as defined under
state law, it seems the much more reasonable approach to analyzing re-
strictions imposed upon that right would be the familiar tripartite balanc-
ing detailed in Penn Central. This would require consideration of the
plaintiffs' property interest as a whole, and would evaluate the deleteri-
ous effects imposed by the regulation in light of the plaintiffs' reasonable
investment-backed expectations for the property. Though perhaps one
could find a means to argue that the Court of Claims' decision was cor-
rect, it seems relatively clear that the analytical tools employed to reach
it were inappropriate for the property interest at issue and the underlying
principles of state and federal law surrounding it. A total takings analysis
seems ill-suited for a right as ethereally defined as the flexible water right
in California; rather the much more accommodating balancing analysis
allowed under Penn Central and its progeny is the better tool for so
unique a property interest.
As the prior discussion has illustrated, the decision reached in Tulare
seems to deteriorate from the initial point at which the property right at
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 407 (1931)).
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risk is defined. By way of brief summary, California's water law decisions
have consistently provided that a water right is limited by reasonable-
ness. Furthermore, these decisions also reveal that a water use that is
reasonable at one point may well be considered unreasonable at another
as statewide priorities evolve. As the State maintains title to all of its wa-
ters at all times, users, through complicated allocations decisions per-
formed by the SWRCB, may come to possess only a right to reasonable
use of those waters. Thus, when a previously reasonable use is later
found to be unreasonable and subsequently proscribed, the usufructuary
right possessed is not altered. The user maintains possession of a right to
reasonable use, therefore, no private property has been taken and no
compensation is required.
Similarly, petitioners in the Yuba River controversy own only a
property right in the waters of the Yuba subject to a reasonableness ser-
vitude. As theories of reasonableness can and do change, discovery of
the rapidly declining populations of listed species in the Yuba River wa-
tershed has revealed the unreasonableness of petitioners current uses of
their rights. Petitioners have not had anything taken from them at all, in
this sense, because they only had a right to use a reasonable amount of
the water. Therefore, petitioners presently possess that which they have
always possessed; a right to the reasonable use of the waters of the Yuba.
Since the petitioners have not been deprived of any private property,
their takings claim must fail.
Even if the petitioners are found to have a property interest in the
water, their takings arguments are still fatally flawed when evaluated un-
der Penn Central. One aspect of Penn Central is that it demands that a
property interest must be considered in its entirety before compensation
for a regulatory taking can be entertained. Though petitioners' property
interests in the water they deliver are subject to the reasonableness servi-
tude developed under Joslin, Decision 1644 can not be seen to eviscerate
Petitioners' rights, as even they admit that any diminution in the volume
of water they may suffer represents only a portion of the total water they
will still withdraw from the Yuba River. Petitioners further admit that
many of these releases, for which they seek government compensation,
are only anticipated for the relatively infrequent, critically dry hydrologic
years. During these years, Petitioners speculate, they will incur increased
expenses pumping groundwater to offset the limitations imposed by De-
cision 1644. Petitioners object because these expenses are substantially
greater than they typically incur from the cheaper process of surface wa-
ter diversion. Just as the Penn Central Railroad was unable to attain
compensation for the limitation imposed on its property through the his-
toric zoning regulation, so too must petitioners bear the added expense
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incurred in fashioning a physical solution to the dispute over the Yuba
River. The railroad's property was always subject to compliance with
New York's zoning regulations, and though that compliance arguably re-
sulted in the loss of speculative profits, this loss was not found to be a
compensable taking. Similarly, petitioners in the Yuba River controversy
own only a property right in the waters of the Yuba subject to a reason-
ableness servitude. Because the amount of water in the river varies each
year with the snowfall, it is not reasonable for petitioners to assume that
their draw from the river would always be constant. On the other hand,
Congress and the State of California have all determined that there is a
strong public interest in protecting endangered species. Thus, when the
strong public interest is balanced against the relatively slight economic
diminution and weak investment-backed expectations, petitioners' tak-
ings arguments must fail.
Additionally, petitioners' takings arguments fail even the more rig-
orous standards developed in Nollan and Dolan. Nollan compels evalua-
tion of the sufficiency of the nexus between the regulatory exaction and
the underlying purposes of the statute by which that exaction is caused."'
The existence of this nexus cannot seriously be questioned. As relating to
petitioners' takings claim, the SWRCB decision recalibrates their water
rights in a reasonable manner as balanced against the demands imposed
by the Endangered Species Act and the listed species it was enacted to
protect. The SWRCB's actions are thus compelled by the state constitu-
tion, judicially created doctrines, and federal law.
Nor does the Dolan test demanding a sufficient degree of connection
between the exaction experienced by the petitioners and the develop-
ment they sought to complete vindicate their takings challenges. The ex-
tensive scientific research conducted by the SWRCB in determining
these flow requirements should more than satisfy the quantification re-
quirements outlined by the Supreme Court in Dolan, and should thus
foreclose a successful takings challenge by Petitioners in the Yuba River
controversy. "3 Though other arguments propounded by Petitioners may
ultimately serve to vindicate their petition for injunctive relief-
Petitioners make arguments based in contract law and the state public
trust doctrine as well-the Takings Clause should not serve them based
on the Supreme Court's articulation of the proper limits of that clause.'74
172. See supra text accompanying notes 83-91.
173. Fishery Res. & Water Right Issues of the Lower Yuba River, Decision 1644 at 57 (Cal. State
Water Res. Control Bd. Mar. i, 2ooi) (tabling specific water flow requirements for above-normal, dry,
below-normal, critical, and extreme-critical water years on the basis of needs for agriculture, fisheries,
and other uses).




Since it was first inhabited by European Americans, the parched
West has sought solutions to its chronic water shortages. As development
pressures continue to mount throughout the region, new pressures, most
notably those imposed by the restrictions of the Endangered Species Act,
have made the resolutions of these disputes even more complex. For a
recent example of such a conflict which garnered national attention, one
need only look to the continuing dispute as to the use of the waters of the
Colorado River. Long responsible for procuring more than its fair share
from the river, California is presently being limited by other Western
states and the federal government to take only its designated share. This
limitation has severe environmental repercussions for endangered and
threatened species in California's Imperial Valley, between the Colorado
river and San Diego.'75
The Supreme Court's decisions have revealed that environmentalists
seeking to secure water need not fear the compensation requirements
imposed by the Fifth Amendment. As the Court's decision in Berman re-
flects, the Takings Clause has long allowed the state to restrict property
interests when they collide with the public interest. Though the Court has
waivered on the specific test to be applied in determining when a com-
pensable taking has occurred, it appears that the Penn Central test is re-
gaining its primacy. The ascendancy of the Penn Central test provides for
a more reasoned analysis, better suited to complex regulatory schemes.
Moreover, it permits a more comprehensive weighing of the various in-
terests at stake in a takings challenge. Finally, a return to Penn Central
balancing allows for greater regulatory flexibility, which, in turn, allows
the state to exercise its police powers to protect environmental interests
without triggering the Takings Clause. This proposition is supported by
the Court's recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra, where environmental inter-
ests triumphed over those of property developers. Such a decision marks
the emergence of a valuable tool in the ongoing struggle to protect di-
minishing natural resources against encroaching pressures of increased
development. Resolution of the Yuba controversy should likewise reflect
accommodation of these environmental interests, and should not be
threatened by the specter of invalidation or prohibitive compensation
requirements that might otherwise stifle the responsible exercise of the
police power.
842-44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that the public trust doctrine does not serve to protect artificial
bodies of water).
175. See Jim Robbins, Farms and Growth Threaten a Sea and Its Creatures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2002, at FI.
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